工 Introduction
The "new economics of p e rsonn e l" brought renewed interest in the decision by firm s to adopt piece rate payment scheme s .
1 Th e se schemes indi v idualize wo rke r rewards by making earnings proportiona1 to results. Wh i1e the v ast major i ty of the n e w literature has been theoretical , empíríca1 studíes ín a varíety of countries confirm many of th e centra1 theoretica1 predíctions ab o ut t h e inf1uence of piece rates and a bout t he ir d e te r mi nants. Siebert and Wei 1996) .
l行1i1e e ach study c onfirms this re1ationship , they a1so present the identica1 e x p1 a n a tion . Fo11owíng Go1dí n (1986) , women have shorter e x pect e d tenure and , as a consequence , cannot be we11 i ~ .\~ \ . \ motiv ated b y d e fer r e d co mp e nsati o n sch e mes of the 50 r t explored by Lazear ( 1 979 , 19 83) .
He nc e , women will be l a rgel y ab s ent in those fi rm s that de fer comp en sa t i on. As de f er ring comp e nsatio n efficiently moti v a t e s on l y l ong te r m worke rs , fir ms with hi gh share s of women must ad op t t he al t er n a t i ve sh ort t er m mo t i v ational sche me of piece rates .
Accor d í n g t o Go l din ， 平J orn e n ar e " n a tura l 1y" s o rted in 七 o piece rates sch emes a s they are n o t in t eres ted in pay ing t he n e a r terrn costs of de f er r ed c omp ensat i o n .
Th us , p r e v io u s e rnp iri c al s tud i e s use the pr eva l enc e of wo me n workers a s a pr oxy to iden tify th e absence of de ferr e d c ompensat i on .
Us ing a u n i q ue s u r vey of Ho ng Ko n g esta b 1i s hm ent s , the d e te rm ina nt s of pie ce r a t e adop t io n are e stima te d. Patterns of historica1 segregation rnay have arisen because of the dìfference betT, oJ een production in which an individual' s production is countab1e and those in which it is not count二 ab1e due to team production. We argue that team production imposes a greater cost for those with 10wer 1abor market attachment . Thus , women wi th historica11y 10we 工 1abor market attachment are 1ess like1y to be observed in team production and more like1y to be subject to piece rates.
Correctly identifying the determinant.s of piece rate adoption ranks as a n important research topic. Petersen (1992) demonstrates that variations in piece 主 ate use by estab1ishments contribute substantially to the distribution of earnings within an occupation. Pencave1 (1977) , Seiler (1984) and Lazear (1996) , each confirm that piece rate use resu1ts in higher earnings than straight time pay for otherwise equa1 workers. The adoption of a piece rates influences current earnings and i5 a5sociated with the length of the employment relationship and the presence of internal 1abor markets. As Petersen 
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Indeed , past studies proxy the absence of deferred compensation by the presence of high shares of female employees and uniform1y find that establishrnents with high shares of fema1es are more like1y to adopt piece rate pa戶nent schemes.
The essence of deferred compensation is that the earnings profile over a worker' s tenure is steeper than would otherwise be implied (Lazear 1979 Yet l Brown (1990) argues that rnerit pay based on perceptions of effort are the rnost arbitrary and this suggests that unions rnay prefer piece
rates to rnerit 問~To test for these conf1icting effects we include whether or not the estab1ishrnent has a recognized union. we note that unions ar~no~ very preva1ent in Hong Kong and that they are genera11y perce~ved to be weak.
As a second effect , Levine and Tyson (1990) argue that a
C09Pξrative inòustria1 relations clirnate is rnore likely to result in
incentive pay schemes.
This argument may we11 app1y to piece ratés because negotiations over the terms of the scheme wi11 be easier with a cooperative climate in which workers perceive that "fairness" can be obtained. Only then will workers be convinced that the employer is not simply going to lower the piece rate (or change other dimensions of the p1an) once workers put forth greater …6) we proxy a cooperative industria1 re1ations clirnate with an indicator of whether or not the estab1ishment has a joint committee for consultation about the terms of employment.
The fourth set of determinants revolve around the nature of prod叫 on. ) Technical change affec ting j obs or working prac tices necessarily causes revision in prices per piece and has been argued to rnake 的 rates less likely (B叫叫).) Each revision raises questions of fairness and requires absorbing ~he costs of deterrnining the new rates.
We control for such technica1 change and a1so for substantia1 organizational change which rnight generate the sarne difficulties.
In ad心。九pi叫以心y ) is perc山d as rnaking piece rates \ / less likely. Parsons (1986) argJes that piece rates run the risk of encouraging damage . or abuse to valuable and comple x rnachinery.
Indeed , high capital intensity rneans that rnore machinery is entrusted to each employee and , under piece rates , rnaintenance rnay suffer (Brown 19 90 ) . J Unfortunate1y I we do not have a direct measure of capital inten 豆 ity and our on1y proxy is the age of the establishment. Th e pat t ern of industrial development in Hong Kong has been such that this rnay capture an e1ement of capita1 intensity . Earlier years saw a concentration of 1abox intensive industries which have been 芷 ep1aced b y ne wer firms with far g(eater capitalintensity. These structural
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• shifts in Hong Kong have been particularly pronounced as described by Suen (1995) . Wh ile many of the labor intensive establishments have moved . to China , we suspect that older firms remain more likely to have the lower capital intensity associated with their vintage and thus be more 1ike1y to use piece rates.
Large scale production is typica11y perceived as making piece rates more 1ikely. ) τhe fixed costs of establishing and administering a piece rate scheme are spread over a larger nurnber of workers.
Indeed , these lower per worker fixed costs have been confirmed by the International Labor Office (see Brown and Medoff , 1989) . Our estimates will include the nurnber of manual employees in the establishment to control for this possible inf1uence.
In addition , we wil1 control for whether or not manual workers represent the largest group of workers wi thin the es tablishment. Together these variables shou1d capture the notion that piece rates will only be established when the resu1ting cost savings are sufficient to cover a substantial fixed cost.
The fina1 maj or set of empirical determ i. nants of piece rate schemes 心ωfrom 叫…ing argument identified by L… (1985) ) According to the theory , not only do piece rates e1 i. cit additional effort from existing workers but they attract more productive workers þy providing them above average earnings for above average production. Lazear (1996) indicates that when the Safe1ite Glass Corporation changed from straight time to piece rates , per worker output increased 41 percent and that 3j8ths of this increase was due to attracting more productive workers. He a1so found that absenteeis m decreased substantia11y. This is a1so a combination of absenteeis m being more expensive under a piece rate scheme and workers with 10wer absenteeism 1n addition , the presence of appraisðl p1ays the expected role.
Those firms using a regu1ar emp10yee appraisal are much less 1ikely to adopt piece rate schemes. The high statistical significance and the large e1asticity suggest this is one of the most crucial determinants.
Plants that adopt piece rates do so to elicit effort in a manner that conserves on managerial resources. Once in place , the piece rate acts as a " se lf-monitoring" scheme that reduces (but surely not eliminates) the need for other managerial oversight.τhis i5 precisely what the reduced use of appraisal schemes demonstrates.
The age of the firm seems to proxy the capital intensity in the anticipated manner. The sectora1 shifts in Hong Kong ímply that there are virtually no high labor íntensity fírms th a. t have started up recently. Any labor intensive fírms are older and it is labor intensive firms that are presumed to more like1y to adopt piece rates.
τhU5 ， the strong partial correlation between t h e age of the fírm and use of piece rates appears sensible . Wh i1e the 10gic obviously seems reasonab1e , the proxy remains imperfect and it remains possib1e that age is p1ay ing an additiona1 role of which we are not aware .
τhere i s a1 s o modest support for the sorting ro1e. The signs on both the i mp o rtance of worker productivity and the importance of absence are positiv e with the 1atter significant. To the extent that firms a d opting piece rates do so in the knowledge that sorting wí1l result , it makes sense that firms sensitive to the s e worker characteristics wou1d adopt piece rates. Obviously , this stands as 15 mu c h more ob1ique confirmation of sorting than that presented by Lazear (1996) yet it is the first such confirmation in across estab1ishment studies. Fina11y I it is crucia1 to note that none of the other resu1ts are sensitive to these sorting variables. In particular neither the role of the prevalence of women nor the indicators of deferred compensation change behavior with the sorting variab1es removed.
As anticipated for Hong Kong , unionization makes no difference.
Indeed , none of the remaining variables (excluding the industry dummies) achieve statistical significance.
Nonetheless , the estirnation in total is high1y significant and does a reasonable job explaining the presence of piece rates with a psuedo r-squared (the likelihood ratio index) of .255 and the dependent variab1e predicted correctly in 83 percent of the cases.
Moreover , we emphasize that this stands as a baseline to which we will add the other indicators of deferred compensa tion.
nature of the results.
These inclusions will obviously alter the Colwnn two presents the augmented specification which includes the three indicators of deferred compensation: the percentage change in pay , whether rnanual worker turnover is cos t1y and the use of dismissals (layoffs) .
Firs t , note that the es tirnation does perforrn better than the parsimonious one. The est i.mation in tota1 remains h i gh1y significant , the psuedo r-squared increases to .302 and the percent of correct observations inc. reases slight1y to 85 percent.
Second , a likelihood ratio test rejects the null hypothesis that the three additional v ariab1es add nothing to the estimations.
The three new variables confirm , on balance , that deferred compensat i on and piece rates are motivational substitutes in the 16 workp1ace. A11 three coefficients are of the expected sign and two of the three are statistica11y significant. As the rate of pay increase within the firm becomes 1arger , the chance of adopting a piece rate scheme dirninishes substantially. Sirnilar1y , when the firm has üsed dism i. ssals 、 in the 1ast three years , the use -of a piece rate is rnore 1ikely. Wh i1e the coefficient of the -turnover cost rneasure does not reach . significance , it has the anticipated negative coefficien 仁 (worker's can be bonded with deferred cornpensation) and does have a t-statistic greater than 1.2. Thus , on balance the direct rneasuresof deferred cornpensation perform we11 in the estimation and confirrn the wide1y he1d hypothesis that piece rates wi11 be observed where deferred compensation is not used. The proj ections vary three measures , the percent women , the change in pay and the use of dismissa1s.
In each case the new va1ue of the under1ying vector is passed through the curnu1ative norma1 to predict the 1ike1ihood of adopting a piece rate.
Wh en the change in pay is 65 percent over 5 years (approxirnately one standard deviation above its mean) and the p1ant has not used dismissa1s , we assume that deferred compensation is 1ikely.
\ \ S i milarl y , when the change in pay is 5 percent over 5 years (appro x imately one standard deviation below its mean) and the plant has used dismissals , we assume that deferred compensation is un1ik、e1y.
We project the likelihood of piece rates for two levels of the prevalence of women: 20 percent and 70 percent.τhese are a1so about a standard deviation either side of the mean.
presents four projections in total.
Thus ， τable
Three First , the influence of deferred compensation is substantial resu1ting in a six fold increase in the like1ihood of adopting piece rates in plants with low shares of women and a1most a four fold increase in plants with high shares of women. Second , the magnitude of the role of the share of women is striking.
Wh en the share is high , a p1ant not using deferred compensation is three times more like1y to adopt piece rates.
Wh en the share is high , a plant using deferred compensation remains almost twice as likely to use piece rates.
Wh ile it remains possib1e that the share of women is simply a proxy for deferred compensation , the current results surely make that questionable.
Including three more direct measures of deferred compensation did nothing to alter the role that the share of women p1ay. Even after the inclusion of these direct measures it rernains a central determinant in the adoption of piece rates. between manageria1 resources and piece rates in the U .K. and he1ps isolate the positive relationship in Australia as paradoxica1.
The absence of an influence for unionization or consul tati ve comrni ttees fi ts wi th the balance of resul ts from other econornies. Unions have the anticipated negative influence on piece rates on1y in the UK and no influence of consultative committees has been confirmed in any economy.τhe sorting variables are unique to the Hong Kong study while the Hong Kong study had no rneasure of part tirne workers.
The one rnajor result absent from the Hong Kong estimation is the confirmation of firm size as determinant of piece rate payment schemes.
Wh ile a11 three other studies present such confirrnation , the size coefficient in the Hong Kong estirnations was routine1y 9 insignificant and the sign was negative.;
It could be the case that other factors work against the traditional size effect. Large firms with greater hierarchy and larger internal labor markets are known to be more 1ikely to adopt promotion based incentive schernes (see Abraham , 1980 and Baker , Jensen and Murphy , 1988) . This may be particularly so in Hong Kong and these competing schemes rnay undercut an otherwise evident tendency to use piece rates.
V. Discussion and Conclusions
This paper expands the set of studies which examine the determinants of piece rates. It does 50 in an economy not previou51y examined , Hong Kong , and provide5 exp1icit compari5ons with those done ín other economíes. It confirms a variety of theoretica1 predictions inc1udíng that piece rates are more 1ike1y when manageria1 resources are not beíng spent on other mechanisms such as appraísa1 systems.
The study a1so provides at 1east oblique confírmation of the sorting hypothesis. Most fundamenta11y , the study examines the crucial played by the share of establishment emp10yees who are women.
τhe parsimonious estímation confirmed the traditional positive relationship between high shaxes of women ernp10yees and the adoption of piece rates. Three índicators of deferred compensation were then included in the estírnation. Two of these were unique to the Hong Kong survey. These new indicators confirmed that when deferred compensation was more likely , piece rates were less likely. Yet , these new results did not at a11 change the importance of the share of women emp10yees as a determinant of piece rate adoption. Th is seems surprising as the on1y rationale consistently advanced for the role of the women share has been that women can not be well moti vated by deferred compensation. Thus , when women are a large share of the e5tablishmen 亡 's work force , deferred compensatíon ís less likely and 50 píece rate adoption is more 1ikely.
Wh ile the re5ults from our estimatíons do not make this logic impossib1e , they do reduce the líkelíhood that ít is the only explanation for the strong role played by the 5hare of 10 women.
Certainly , the 510pe of the tenure earnings profi1e , together wíth the other two variables , would seem to more directly capture the 20 presence of deferred compensation.
The persistence of the share of wornen as a determinant would seern to demand additional explanation.
τo conclude we suggest three alternative explanations that may p1ay sorne role in explaining the continued strength of the share of women employees in the face of the alternative indicators of deferred compensation.
We do not pretend that we can directly test for these alternatives but contend they should be part of further surveys and ernpirical testing.
The view of women workers as being characterised by shorter expected tenure is obviously correct but incomp1ete. Lower expected tenure is on1y one manifestation of 10wer labor force attachment. For instance , Corcoran and Duncan (1979) find that women are more likely to take time off for their own illness , more like1y to take tíme off for the illness of a farnily member , more likely to place 1i血 its (either hours or distance) on the jobs they accept and are more 1ikely to qui t in the near future for reasons unre lated to j ob training.
工 ndeed ， these differences are observable not on1y across occupations but also within (see Wood , Corcoran and Courant 1993) . This broader vie\" of lower labor force attachrnent may provide ins ight into the concentration of women on piece rate schernes.
The essence of piece rate schemes is that output of each worker is distinct and can be attributed to an individual . Such a production process involves a minimum of tearn work (Alchian and Demsetz 1972).
Wh en team work charac terises produc tion , i 吐 entifying an individual contribution is necessari1y difficult.
Moreover , when 七 eam work characterises production , 10w labor force attachrnent imposes a much higher cost. For example , when a worker calls in sick at the last minute a firm without team production loses just that worker's output bu 仁 a firm with team production risks losing much or all of the outpu仁 of the entire team.
Those firms with a production process characterized by team w~rk will use managerial oversight as a method of monitoring effort. Th is monitoring process rnay involve deferred compensation but need not.
The process could also include merit pay allocations or sanctions for workers who shirk. Wh atever the rnonitoring process involves , itwill not include piece rates and production will be sensitive to low labor force attachment.τhus ， we rnight anticipate a positive relationship between the percent wornen workers and piece rate adoption that goes beyond the use of deferred compensation. The lower labor force attachrnent of women makes thern less -dësirab1e in team production and it is only in the absence of team production that piece rates can be successful1y used.
The long history of gender segregation in work tasks rnay feed into the differential use of piece rates. Women have traditionally worked at home at tasks that do not contain large e1ements of team production.τheir rnovement to the labor force in j obs related to their tasks at home would further increase the 1ikelihood that they would be subj ect to piece rates. As an illustration , the need1e trades have a long tradition of piece rate adoption. These tasks are simi1ar to those historica11y performed by women at home and are 11 characterized by only modest degrees of team production..~ It seems likely that women would be concentrated in needle trades and that piece rates would be adopted. This seems likely without any appeal to deferred compensation.
To the extent that societal pressures concentrate women in "women' s work " (tasks similar to those traditiona1ly done at home)
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there may be yet another element driving the strong correlation between women and piece rates.
A disproportionate share of women are segregated into occupatlons characterised by low levels of team production and thus particularly suitable for piece rate adoption.
Thus , one need not assume (although it may be the case) that the conc~ntration of women in piece rate schemes is efficient to generate a sensib1e theory behind the correlation. 1 t could be societal pressure for women to remain in a narrow set of occupations combined with the characteristics of production in those occupations which generates the correlation. 守。 1-y
In Short ( ;e suggest that broadening the …… beyond deferred compensation stands_ the best chanée of explaining the re1ationship between women workers and piece rates. Lower labor force attachment more genera1ly argues that women rnay be concentrated in occupations with 10w 1eve1s of team production and , hence , a high chance of using piece rates. This tendency may be compounded by the skills women bring frorn traditional work at home and by societal pressures to keep women in these j obs.
Certain1y , the resul ts from Hong Kong suggest that the association between women and piece rates goes beyond deferred compensation. Wh i1e additional research is sure1y warranted , the current results do ca1l for a broader focus of the sort we suggest.
There remains an a1 ternati ve explanation for the ro1e of an establishment's percent women in predicting use of piece rates.
Discrimination against women may be particular1y difficu1t when earnings are based on an objective measure of performance such as the actua1 number of pieces produced . Thus , women may avoid work settings in which earnings and prornotion resu1t from a male supervisor's J .0112** (.0053) [.469] . 可<The UK study the presence of "high technology" to proxy capita1 lntensity.
次 *The UK and Australia studies both use the share of managers as an indicator of manageria1 resources.
*決 *The UK measure was the share working parttime while the Austra1ia measure was the percent officially designated as "casua1."
Note: USA (Brown 1990 ) I Austra1ia (Drago and Heywood 1995) I UK (Heywood , Siebert and Wei 1996) . ENDNOTES 1,rh i S new emphas is i S summarized in the J.-9.且主旦旦1. Q主 1.豆h立主 Economics (1987) vo1ume dedicated to the subject and in the new text by Lazear (1996) . 2rndeed , in February 1996 , fu11-tirne rnen ernp10yees in Hong Kong had an average tenure of 81.2 months wi11 that for fu11-time women employees was 54.7 months . These figures are computed from the "Public Survey" commissioned by the Education and Manpower Branch of the Hong Kong governrnent.
3 rt is possible that \、 lornen even compete harder for piece rate j obs knowing that their a1ternative is straight time rate jobs.
4τhe fi ve year benchmark was chosen to minimize the influence of iτ1vestment in ernp10yer specific human capita1 which should have been undertaken very ear1y in a worker's tenure.
5Note that firrns with appraisa1s may include those with deferred cornpensation because detection of shirking is sti11 needed even when the costs of job 10st are high.
6 See Gibbons (1987) for a mode1 of an employer doing just this. 70fficia1s of the Census and Statistics Department suggested to us that the cha r acteristics of the respondents aligned we11 with the full popu1ation .
8τhe U . K. figure a1so identifies piece rate use for manual workers which , while c1ose , need not be identical with the definition we have adopted .
